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Abstract 
Most motor bodily injury (BI) claims are settled by negotiation, with fewer 
than 5% of cases going to court. A well-defined negotiation strategy is thus 
very useful for insurance companies. In this paper we assume that the 
monetary compensation awarded in court is the upper amount to be offered 
by the insurer in the negotiation process. Using a real database, a log-linear 
model is implemented to estimate the maximal offer. Non-spherical 
disturbances are detected. Correlation occurs when various claims are 
settled in the same judicial verdict. Groupwise heteroscedasticity is due to 
the influence of the forensic valuation on the final compensation amount.  
Keywords: Multivariate statistics; Negotiation process; Generalized 
confidence intervals. 
JEL Classification: C31, C53, G22. 
 
Resumen  
La mayoría de siniestros con daños corporales se liquidan mediante 
negociación, llegando a juicio menos del 5% de los casos. Una estrategia 
de negociación bien definida es, por tanto, fundamental para las compañías 
aseguradoras. En este artículo asumimos que la compensación monetaria 
concedida en juicio es la máxima cuantía que debería ser ofrecida por el 
asegurador en el proceso de negociación. Usando una base de datos real, 
implementamos un modelo log-lineal para estimar la máxima oferta de 
negociación. Perturbaciones no-esféricas son detectadas. Correlación 
ocurre cuando más de una siniestro se liquida en la misma sentencia 
judicial. Heterocedasticidad por grupos se debe a la influencia de la 
valoración del forense en la indemnización final.  
 
 3
1. Introduction 
Although motor bodily injury (BI) insurance claims are less frequent than 
those with only material damages, they represent the largest cumulative costs 
for motor insurers. Moreover, BI claims show a high variability in payments. 
Therefore, in most countries motor BI claims are not included in direct 
reimbursement systems (i.e. no-fault systems), and consequently, road traffic 
victims with personal damages must be compensated by the insurer of the 
driver responsible for the accident. 
In general terms, if there are no discrepancies about who is at fault for 
the accident, insurers will attempt to reach a friendly agreement with the 
claimant as regards financial compensation. The compensation offered by the 
insurer in the negotiation process depends on the claim information available, 
and especially on the medical reports. The insurance company’s medical staff 
evaluate the personal damage to the victim in successive examinations during 
his/her recovery, and when the insurance company has to negotiate the 
compensation, its monetary offer is mainly based on the information gathered 
during these examinations. In contrast, the sum requested by the claimant is 
founded on his/her own evidence (e.g. loss of earnings, independent medical 
reports and so forth).  
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When the two parties fail to reach an agreement on the claim 
compensation amount, the lawsuit will go to court and the compensation will 
be established by judicial verdict. In countries like the UK or the USA only 
1% of claims are settled by judicial verdict (Lewis, 2006; Derrig and 
Rempala, 2006). In Spain, from where the database used in this paper was 
obtained, the percentage of motor BI claims settled in court rises to 5-10% of 
cases, depending on the insurance company. Most compensation payments 
are therefore the result of a negotiation process between parties. 
This paper analyzes the claim compensations awarded by courts in 
order to gain some insight into the compensation amount for which the BI 
claim could be settled prior to judicial decision. The aim was to estimate the 
maximum compensation amount that should be accepted by the insurer in the 
negotiation process (max offer). In particular, we consider that the expected 
BI claim compensation awarded by courts should be interpreted by the insurer 
as the maximum offer in the negotiation process. When the minimum 
compensation amount that the claimant is willing to accept is larger than this 
maximum offer, then the insurance company should decide to take it to court. 
In the actuarial literature there is relatively little empirical research 
regarding the negotiation process between the insurer and the claimant. 
Indeed, previous studies have normally only dealt implicitly with the 
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negotiation issue, and have mainly focused on quantifying the effect of 
suspicion of fraud on the BI claim settlement, this effect being considered as 
the negotiation margin on the final compensation. Crocker and Tennyson 
(2002), for instance, show that insurers pay on average lower compensations 
on claims with a low falsification cost. Loughran (2005) demonstrates that 
insurers under-indemnify general damages when special damages exceed their 
expected value and vice versa. Other authors have dealt with the optimal level 
of claim investigation according to the potential for reducing the claim cost 
(D’Arcy, 2005; Viaene et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, some recent contributions have analyzed variables that 
are directly related to the negotiation of the claim compensation (Derrig and 
Weisberg, 2004; Derrig and Rempala, 2006). In Derrig and Weisberg (2004), 
BI claim settlements are explained by variables such as the claimant 
compensation demand or whether a suit was filed. The authors suggest that 
more aggressive demands for pain and suffering damages frequently obtain 
higher claim compensations. Derrig and Rempala (2006) consider the 
negotiation process as a sequence of claimant demands and insurer offers 
until an agreement is reached. The authors fit a non-homogenous Poisson 
process to explain this stochastic process and show that two subsets of 
negotiations can be identified, fast and slow, which depend on the initial 
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compensation demand or the period until the claim was reported, among other 
factors (see, for a price negotiation, Kristensen and Gärlig, 2000). 
In our study, we apply a log-linear model to estimate BI claims 
compensations awarded by courts. Groupwise heteroscedasticity and 
correlation in the error term are possible, the former being due to the forensic 
performance. Correlation among observations occurs when more than one 
claim is involved in the same judicial sentence. Results are obtained from an 
unbalanced dataset which consists of few observations per unit record 
(maximum three claimants per verdict). Due to the sample framework, 
Satterthwaite’s approximation (as implemented in SAS) does not perform 
correctly in order to construct confidence limits for the correlation parameter 
estimate. An alternative methodology based on generalized inference is thus 
applied for interval estimation (Tsui and Weerahandi, 1989). In particular, the 
Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval in the presence of groupwise 
heteroscedasticity is estimated (Park and Burdick, 2003; 2004).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief overview of the 
BI claim handling process is presented in the next section. Section 3 describes 
the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 defines the log-linear model 
specification and gives the estimation results, including the generalized 
confidence interval in the correlation parameter estimate. An example is 
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presented to illustrate the application of the model in estimating the maximum 
compensation amount in a deal between parties. Finally, in Section 5, we 
summarize the main findings and present some concluding remarks.  
2. Automobile liability insurance claim handling process 
Automobile liability insurance covers any damage as a result of an 
automobile accident for which the insured driver was responsible. Two types 
of damages due to the accident should be distinguished: material 
consequences and damages to the person. The former include material 
damages (car, personal possessions, etc.) and also any incurred medical 
expenses or loss of earnings (both, past and future). Damage to the person 
includes bodily injury and pain and suffering, which is defined as the physical 
or emotional distress resulting from the injury. Material damages and medical 
expenses seem to be easily justified by the claimant and verified by the 
insurer, and consequently, few disputes related to the compensation amount 
for these concepts are expected. Denial of responsibility for the accident is, in 
principle, the only reason for litigation. In contrast, the assessment of loss of 
earnings and damages to the person is more controversial and often causes 
disputes between claimants and insurers. This paper focuses on these 
damages, which are referred to as bodily injury (BI) claims.  
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BI claim handling refers to the process that starts when the accident 
occurrence is reported to the insurer and ends with the payment by the insurer 
for BI damages covered. The claim handling process (see Fig. 1) includes: i) 
the claim reporting, ii) the recovery period for the victim’s injury, and finally, 
iii) the settlement phase.   
FIGURE 1. Insurance claim settlement process 
 
2.1 Claim reporting 
When an accident takes place, victims who are not responsible for it may 
claim compensation for damages. Several countries require that a judicial 
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process be initiated in such circumstances. Indeed, victims must file a lawsuit 
in order to be entitled to the compensation payment. Some countries, such as 
Ireland, have set up a previous statutory body that is responsible for assessing 
compensations with the aim of reducing litigation. Only if parties reject the 
assessment is the action pursued through the courts system. In these cases it is 
also the victim who must make the application to the statutory body. Under 
Spanish law, victims have six months from the time of the accident in which 
to file the lawsuit. Victims are entitled to claim only compensation for 
damages suffered, done by filing a tort suit, or also the punishment of the 
driver, for which a criminal suit is required. 
At this stage the insurer obtains general claim information related to the 
accident characteristics, such as the number and type of vehicles involved, 
whether there were BI victims and so forth. Unlike road accidents with 
material damages, accidents with victims are usually communicated to the 
insurer shortly after they occur. Nevertheless, BI claims may remain unsettled 
for several years before victims are indemnified. This is because, firstly, the 
victim must be fully recovered and, subsequently, the compensation amount 
must be either agreed upon between the parties, assessed by a statutory body 
or, in the last resort, set by judicial order. 
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2.2 Recovery period 
During the period in which the victim is recovering, the insurer wishes to 
know the evolution of his/her BI damages. With this objective, medical 
experts (appointed by the insurer) evaluate the injury severity of the victim in 
successive examinations. In Spain, motor bodily injury compensations must 
be dealt with in accordance with a legislative disability scale. The disability 
scale consists of an injury scoring system and a compensation scale. The 
scoring system provides a range of possible sequelae*1 resulting from the 
accident and sets a maximum-minimum score for each one according to the 
injury severity. The monetary amount is determined on the compensation 
scale, which depends on the total score of sequelae (positively) and the age of 
the victim (inversely). Other countries, such as France or Italy, have similar 
systems of compensation. Normally, the insurer’s medical experts make their 
evaluations fit with sequelae and severity scores defined in the legislative 
scoring system. 
The follow-up examinations carried out by the insurer are useful for 
reserving purposes during the time that the claim remains open. In Ayuso and 
Santolino (2007), for instance, this information is used to predict the final 
                                                 
* Sequela is the definitive reduction of a person’s physical and/or mental potential 
that can be medically explained. 
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severity of the victim’s injury at different stages during the life of the claim 
and, subsequently, the authors show that the individual claim provision can be 
estimated according to the predicted severity. When the victim has recovered, 
the follow-up examinations provide the core information for determining the 
compensation amount to offer in the negotiation. When the lawsuit follows 
the criminal procedure, a forensic doctor also examines the recovered victim. 
Forensic doctors must describe the victim’s sequelae in accordance with the 
Spanish disability rating scale, but they are not obliged to measure severity by 
awarding a score; however, they may do so in order to assist the judge. 
2.3 The settlement phase: negotiation-litigation 
After the victim’s recovery, the insurer and the claimant start negotiation in 
order to reach an agreement on the BI compensation amount. Normally, this 
negotiation is carried out by a lawyer and a staff adjuster, acting on behalf of 
the claimant and the insurance company, respectively. The first proposal of 
compensation is commonly made by the staff adjuster who communicates an 
offer to the claimant’s lawyer. This compensation offer is based on the 
medical information available to the insurer; thus, the adjuster mainly 
assesses the claim by applying the compensation scale (provided in the 
legislative disability scale) to the severity score and number of recovery days 
considered by the medical expert in the last examination. 
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In contrast, the lawyer requests claimant compensation for BI damages 
according to the medical examinations presented by his client and other 
personal evidence. If the insurer’s offer satisfies the claimant’s demand, then 
the adjuster and the lawyer will reach a compensation agreement. Indeed, the 
claim is then settled and the handling process ends. However, the lawyer will 
refuse the offer when it is not sufficient to cover the claim. At this point, the 
lawyer has two options: to present a counter-demand of compensation or to 
stop the negotiation and wait for a court hearing. In the latter, the BI claim 
compensation will be settled by judicial decision. When the lawyer chooses to 
request a second claim, then the settlement decision shifts to the adjuster. As 
with the lawyer previously, the adjuster may now accept the counter-demand, 
refuse it and present a counter-offer, or wait for a court hearing. These rounds 
of negotiation are repeated until a compensation deal is reached, or the date 
for the court hearing arrives. 
The final result of the settlement process is uncertain and depends on 
multiple factors such as the negotiation strategies of both parties and whether 
or not the claimant is willing to wait until the court hearing for monetary 
compensation, and so on. Neither side in the negotiation has, in principle, a 
vested interest in the court option due to its associated higher costs and 
duration. Therefore, when the difference between the offer and demand 
amounts is not too large, the parties will be flexible in their respective 
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positions in order to reach an agreement. However, determining how far the 
parties are willing to move from their initial positions before going to court is 
not an easy task. Indeed, despite the possibility of using game theory, i.e. the 
branch of science which deals with negotiation between agents and presents 
formal solutions (see Nelson Jr., 2002), factors other than strategies may play 
a role, for instance, the claimant’s financial situation. 
In practice, the size of the increment from the initial offer to the final 
one depends on the negotiation experience of the adjuster and his skill in 
bargaining with the lawyer, as well, of course, on the lawyer’s ability. 
Adjuster supervisors can monitor the performance of their adjuster teams and 
offer them general guidelines in the negotiation strategy. However, adjusters 
have broad autonomy during the negotiation process in decisions regarding 
increments of the offer. In the last resort, they also decide the maximum 
compensation to offer in the negotiation and, therefore, to go to court when 
this amount is exceeded. In this paper we develop an automated tool which 
helps the insurer’s adjuster to estimate the maximum offer in the negotiation 
process. The model regressors relate to BI claim information collected by the 
insurer during the claim handling process.  
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3. Spanish bodily injury claims database 
The dataset consists of 114 Spanish motor BI claims settled by judicial 
decision between 2001 and 2003. The database was provided by a Spanish 
insurer who was legally responsible for compensation payments. Each claim 
record represents a victim whom the insurer had to compensate for bodily 
injury damages. Some of these claims were judged in the same trial. In 
particular, there are 4 judicial verdicts involving three BI claims each, 14 
involving two, and 74 verdicts involving only one claim. In total, the 114 BI 
claims were settled by 92 judicial verdicts or, in other words, around 20% of 
court verdicts relate to more than one victim.   
Since insurer and plaintiff negotiate the compensation amount when the 
victim is fully recovered, we assume that the insurer followed up the victim 
during the recovery period and that at the time of negotiation the insurance 
company has the whole claim information available. In particular, it is 
assumed that the insurer’s medical experts examined the victim at the 
beginning and end of the recovery period and wrote up an initial and final 
medical report, respectively. Explanatory variables included in the model are 
presented in Table 1. We also show some descriptive measures for the overall 
sample. 
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TABLE 1. Variables in the model and some descriptive statistics  
  Mean SD  
y Compensation amount awarded in judicial sentence in euros (on log scale). 8.260 1.306 
x1 1 if the victim’s vehicle is a car; 0=otherwise (e.g. van, motorbike, pedestrians). 0.596 0.493 
x2 1 if male; 0=otherwise. 0.509 0.502 
x3 Victim’s age (1 if age 0 to 9; 2 if 10 to 19; and so forth). 3.868 1.686 
x4 1 if the last medical report is the same as the initial medical report; 0=otherwise. 0.316 0.467 
x5 Number of sequelae (final medical report). 1.114 1.655 
x6 Sequelae number variation across reports (final medical report minus initial one). 0.009 0.917 
x7 Number of recovery days with disability for working (final medical report). 53.132 63.027 
x8 Number of recovery days without disability for working (final medical report). 37.596 59.699 
x9 
Variation in the number of recovery days unable to work across reports (final 
medical report minus initial one). 2.079 37.601 
x10 
Variation in the number of recovery days not unable to work across reports (final 
medical report minus initial one). 7.210 32.456 
x11.1 
1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and assesses the severity of his/her 
sequelae; 0=otherwise. 0.210 0.409 
x11.2 
1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and indicates his/her sequelae but doesn’t 
assess the severity of them; 0=otherwise. 0.342 0.477 
x11.3 1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and doesn’t award sequelae; 0=otherwise. 0.342 0.477 
x11.4 1 if there was no forensic report (civil procedure); 0=otherwise. 0.105 0.308 
n=92 judicial verdicts; N=114 claims. 
 
Regression variables refer to attributes of the victim such as gender (x2) 
and age (x3), type of victim’s vehicle and information collected in medical 
reports. Regarding the vehicle type, a dichotomous variable (x1) is included 
which indicates whether the casualty was travelling by car. As for the 
information from the final medical report, we consider the number of sequelae 
(x5) and the number of recovery days caused by the accident according to the 
medical expert’s examination. In Spain, legislation distinguishes between 
recovery days in which the victim was disabled for working purposes from 
those without disability for working. Both variables are included in the model 
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regression (x7 and x8). In order to avoid collinearity problems, the variations 
between reports rather than the raw information from the initial medical 
report were considered. In particular, we observe the variation across medical 
reports in the number of sequelae (x6) and the number of recovery days 
disabled and not disabled for working (x9 and x10). In addition, a control 
variable is added to indicate those claims in which only one medical report 
was produced (x4).  
Finally, four categorical variables related to the forensic performance 
have been defined, and these variables reflect the different ways in which the 
forensic doctor participates in the claim settlement process. The first one 
(x11.1) indicates whether the forensic doctor examined the victim, awarded 
him/her sequelae and assessed their severity. The second one (x11.2) refers to 
whether the forensic doctor examined the victim, awarded sequelae but didn’t 
assess their severity. The third option (x11.3) is that the forensic doctor 
evaluated the victim but didn’t assign him/her sequelae. The previous three 
categories refer to criminal suits. However, when the claimant files a tort suit 
the forensic doctor does not participate. This situation is considered in our 
fourth category (x11.4). It should be noted that we have included only these 
categorical regressors from the information collected in the forensic report to 
prevent civil lawsuits from being treated as missing values in the dataset.  
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4. Insurer’s maximum offer of compensation  
Our goal is to estimate the maximum claim compensation to be offered by the 
insurer in the negotiation process. As previously remarked, we consider that 
the monetary compensation which would be awarded by the judge in the 
judicial proceeding is the maximum offer of compensation that should be 
made by the insurer in the negotiation. A log-linear model with nonspherical 
disturbances is implemented to estimate BI claims compensations awarded by 
courts. 
4.1 Model specification 
Insurance data frequently present an unbalanced design, i.e. there is not the 
same number of observations per unit record of the data set (e.g. the number 
of covered risks in each individual policy). Log-linear models may be 
implemented for both balanced and unbalanced data, although the inference 
techniques used depend on the type of data (Khuri et al., 1998). In the current 
application, a log-linear regression model has been applied to estimate the 
claim compensation awarded in courts. Let us suppose that the data set 
consists of n subjects, where ni is the number of observations for the ith 
subject, 1 .i n£ £  In our specification i indicates the judicial verdict 
(1 92)i£ £  and ni the number of claims settled in the ith verdict (1 3)in£ £ . 
Our database is unbalanced since not all judicial verdicts involve the same 
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number of BI claims. The overall sample size N is obtained as the sum of all 
the claims settled in each verdict, 
92
1
114.i
i
n
=
=å   
Groupwise heteroscedasticity is due to the forensic performance. Note 
that the forensic examination is the only impartial evaluation of the victim’s 
severity, and thus it is likely to have a strong influence on the judge’s 
decision. At this point, we suggest that claims may have different variability 
in compensations depending on whether the forensic doctor participates or not 
in the claim settlement process, and also on the nature of this participation. 
The residual variance is parameterized as 2
ges , where g indicates the category 
of the variable related to the forensic performance x11.g with g=1,…,4 (as 
shown in Table 1). The residual correlation among BI victims judged in the 
same court verdict is also considered. The correlation parameter is 2as . The 
model is specified as follows: 
 2 2( ), =1, ,92, 1 ,
gij ij i
y N i j nε ασ σ+ ≤ ≤x β, : K  (1) 
where yij is the compensation amount (on log scale) awarded by the judge in 
the i-th judicial verdict to the j-th victim and with g-th residual variance, such 
that 1 4.g≤ ≤  β (p×1) is the vector of p unknown parameters and, finally, xij 
(1×p) is the design vector. Independence between judicial verdicts is 
assumed. 
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Variance components are estimated by maximizing the restricted 
likelihood function (REML), 
1/2
' -1
1
det X V X
n
REML i i i ML
i
L L
−
=
•⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , where Xi(ni×p) and 
Vi(ni×ni) are the design and the covariance matrices of the i-th sentence, and 
MLL  the likelihood function (Verbeke and Molenberghs, 2000). REML 
estimators are generally preferred to maximum likelihood estimators due to 
their optimal minimum variance properties (for a detailed discussion, see 
Robinson, 1987; Searle et al., 1992). When variance components are replaced 
by their estimators, the empirical βˆ  is obtained as 
' -1 1 ' -1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) .
n n
i i i i i i
i i
−
= =
= ∑ ∑X V X X Vβ y  
Statistical inference is based on Wald and likelihood ratio tests (Khury et al., 
1998). Confidence intervals on variance parameters are estimated by means of 
Satterthwaite’s approximation, which takes into account the fact that these 
parameters have a lower boundary at zero. 
4.2 Estimation results 
The results are presented in Table 2, which also shows the 90% confidence 
intervals for the parameter estimates. The Wald limits were estimated for the 
regression parameters and the Satterthwaite limits for the parameters of the 
residual variance. For unbalanced designs, Satterthwaite’s approximation can 
produce unacceptably liberal confidence intervals on 2ασ  (Burdick and 
Graybill, 1992). For this reason, the Park-Burdick generalized confidence 
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interval is provided in Table 2. Although alternative generalized confidence 
intervals on 2ασ  may usually be derived (Zhou and Mathew, 1994), Arendacká 
(2005) demonstrated that the generalized confidence interval provided by 
Park and Burdick performs best in terms of the confidence interval yielded.  
TABLE 2. Estimation results (90% confidence level) 
 Coeff. p-value Lower- bound  
Upper-
bound  
β0 Constant 8.393 0.000*** 7.908 8.880 
x1  1 if the victim’s vehicle is a car; 0=otherwise (e.g. 
van, motorbike, pedestrians). 
-0.215 0.119 -0.443 0.013 
x2  1 if male; 0=otherwise. -0.766 0.004*** -1.152 -0.380 
x3  Victim’s age (1 if age 0 to 9; 2 if 10 to 19; and so 
forth). 
0.051 0.216 -0.019 0.121 
x4  1 if the last medical report is the same as the initial 
medical report; 0=otherwise. 
-0.878 0.001*** -1.222 -0.534 
x5  Number of sequelae (last medical report). 0.216 0.002*** 0.121 0.310 
x6  Sequelae number variation across reports (last 
medical report minus initial one). 
-0.270 0.013** -0.435 -0.105 
x7 Number of recovery days with disability for 
working (last medical report). 
0.009 0.000*** 0.006 0.011 
x8 Number of recovery days without disability for 
working (last medical report). 
0.006 0.005*** 0.003 0.008 
x9 
Variation in the number of recovery days unable to 
work across reports (last medical report minus 
initial one). 
-0.005 0.016** -0.008 -0.002 
x10 
Variation in the number of recovery days not 
unable to work across reports (last medical report 
minus initial one). 
-0.001 0.626 -0.006 0.004 
x11.3 1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and doesn’t 
award sequelae; 0=otherwise. 
-0.716 0.000*** -0.974 -0.457 
x12 1 if x2=0 y x4=0; 0=otherwise. -0.660 0.023** -1.109 -0.210 
2
ασ  Correlation parameter 0.028 0.403 0.000 0.280 
1
2
εσ  Residual variance if x11.1=1 0.768 0.001*** 0.478 1.475 
2
2
εσ  Residual variance if x11.2=1 0.172 0.096* 0.069 1.201 
3
2
εσ  Residual variance if x11.3=1 0.466 0.001*** 0.297 0.859 
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4
2
εσ  Residual variance if x11.4=1 0.664 0.021** 0.346 1.897 
N:114; χ2= 12.490 (p-value: 0.029) 
*** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance level. 
 
The chi-square statistic was computed as minus two times the 
difference between the log restricted-likelihood for the model and the log 
restricted-likelihood when 2 0ασ =  and 2 2 , .g gε εσ σ= ∀  The significance of the 
statistic indicates that a model with spherical perturbations is rejected.  
Regarding the estimated parameters of the regressors, all coefficients 
are significant, except those related to the victim’s vehicle (x1), the victim’s 
age (x3) and the variation across reports in the number of recovery days not 
disabled for working (x10). Many authors have shown that the victim’s age is 
positively correlated with the motor bodily injury severity (Lee and Abdel-
Aty, 2005; Wang and Kockelman, 2005; Ayuso and Santolino, 2007). In 
contrast, and as pointed out in section 2.2, the monetary value stipulated in the 
Spanish legislative disability scale for the compensation assessment of the 
motor victim’s injury is inversely related to the victim’s age. Therefore, we 
suggest that the lack of explanatory capacity for this variable in the model 
could be due to the fact that the aforementioned effects counteract each other. 
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Hence, older victims have more serious injuries resulting from the accident, 
but at the same time they receive less money for them. 
The remaining parameter influences on the claim compensation are as 
expected, for example, the bodily injury severity awarded in the last medical 
report is positively related to the final claim compensation, and the expected 
compensation decreases when the forensic doctor examined the victim and 
didn’t award sequelae. Note that two of the three variables from the initial 
medical report (x6, x9) have significant coefficients and with a negative sign. 
As a prudent practice, medical experts often consider a higher injury severity 
in the initial examination than in the final one, and thus x6 and x9 usually take 
negative values. Finally, whenever the final medical report is different from 
the initial one or the victim is a woman, the expected claim compensation 
increases. However, when these features are observed at the same time, both 
marginal effects are partially counterbalanced by the influence of the joint 
variable x12.  
Unlike residual variance estimates, the correlation parameter estimate is 
near zero. This result is surprising since it would seem naive to believe that 
victims settled in the same judicial verdict are not correlated. Thus, we 
consider that the low value of the correlation parameter estimate is due to the 
sample design. Indeed, as was pointed out in section 3, only a few sample 
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individuals (i.e. judicial sentences) have more than one observation (i.e. BI 
victims involved). Therefore, it makes sense to construct the upper-limit 
estimate of the parameter with a confidence level. Note that the upper-bound 
of the Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval is around 0.3. 
4.3 Empirical estimation of the maximal compensation offer in the 
negotiation process 
 
In this section an example of predicting the maximum insurer offer in the 
negotiation process is presented for two different scenarios. The upper-bound 
of the maximum offer, for a given confidence level, is also computed. 
Predictions are on a logarithmic scale and, therefore, they must be 
transformed to the original scale following the well-known characteristics of 
the lognormal distribution, i.e. if 2ln( ) ( , )Nη μ σ:  then 20,5[ ]E eμ ση +=  and 
( )2 22V ar[ ] 1 .e eμ σ ση += −  
Let us suppose that the insurance company wants to negotiate the BI 
compensation amount for the victims of two claims (A and B). Claim A 
concerns a 20-year-old man who suffered a motorbike accident. The initial 
and final medical reports are available to the insurer. In both medical reports 
the medical experts considered that the victim required 35 days for recovery 
and that he was temporarily disabled for work during this period. 
Furthermore, the victim did not suffer sequelae after recovery. The lawsuit 
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follows a civil procedure and, therefore, the forensic doctor does not 
participate.  
Claim B concerns a 35-year-old woman who was injured in an accident 
with her car. Medical experts of the responsible driver’s insurance company 
examined the victim at the beginning and end of the recovery period, and in 
both examinations the same injury severity was awarded. According to these 
examinations, the woman had four sequelae resulting from the accident and 
was temporarily disabled for work for 50 days. In addition, she needed a 
further 15 recovery days after she became able to work. Since the victim filed 
a criminal suit against the insured driver for her injuries, she was also 
examined by a forensic doctor. The insurer knows that the forensic doctor 
awarded sequelae to her but did not assess their severity. Predictions of 
maximal compensation offers and upper-bounds for both claims are shown in 
Table 3.  
TABLE 3. Example of predicting the maximum compensation offer (in Euros) 
CLAIM A  CLAIM B 
Predicted  
max offer 
Std. Err. 
Predic.* 
Upper 
bound± 
 Predicted  
max offer 
Std. Err. 
Predic.* 
Upper 
bound± 
on log scale    on log scale   
8.092 0.151 8.340  9.774 0.277 10.228 
on original scale   on original scale  
3305.69 502.018 4129.00  18258.11 5156.079 26714.08 
* For details of the prediction error variance, see Harville and Jeske (1992). 
±  95% confidence level. 
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For claim A (Table 3, first three columns) the insurance company 
should go to court when the claimant does not accept compensation lower 
than €3305.69 in the negotiation process. Furthermore, the insurer knows that 
in the event of a court ruling the compensation awarded by judicial verdict 
would be lower than €4129.00, with a 95% confidence level. In contrast, for 
claim B (Table 3, last three columns) the maximum compensation offered in 
the negotiation process rises to €18258.11, with the insurer being aware that 
the claim compensation awarded by a court ruling could reach €26714.08, 
once again with a confidence level of 95%.  
Therefore, we have shown that the presented methodology provides a 
guideline for estimating the maximum compensation for BI damages to be 
offered in the negotiation process. Indeed, we provide the insurance adjuster 
with a tool to determine the margin in the claim negotiation before going to 
court. Furthermore, since distributional assumptions are considered, the 
deviation from the expected maximum compensation cost with a confidence 
level can also be known by the adjuster.  
In this paper we have assumed that the correlation in residuals is caused 
by unobserved factors resulting from the same court verdict. Therefore, only 
those parameters which are common for all individuals were estimated. 
However, the presented methodology would still be valid when the cause of 
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correlation was exclusively that compensations were settled by the same 
adjudicator. Since it is an observed factor it would also be necessary to 
estimate the subject-specific parameter, i.e. the deviation from the expected 
mean compensation associated with the aforementioned person. This would 
be achieved by including a random-effect in the model specification. 
6. Conclusions 
Motor insurers always negotiate with accident victims about financial 
compensation for injuries before taking the dispute to court. In this paper we 
develop a methodology that assists insurance staff in the negotiation of bodily 
injury (BI) claims. In particular, we show how to estimate the maximum 
compensation that the insurer should be willing to offer the claimant in the 
negotiation process. In addition, the statistical basis of the suggested 
methodology enables the upper-bound maximal offer to be computed with a 
confidence level. By fixing the negotiation limit, the insurer provides staff 
adjusters with homogeneous and unequivocal norms for the settlement of 
disputes. Nevertheless, the maximum offer of compensation provided by our 
methodology supplements — but does not replace — the subjective claim 
assessment made by the insurance adjuster. Indeed, the methodology allows 
the insurer to assess the staff adjusters’ work, monitoring how much money is 
saved when claims are negotiated instead of settled by judicial verdict.  
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A log-linear model is implemented to estimate the maximum offer 
according to attributes of the victim and characteristics of the claim record, 
including medical reports. The model specification includes residual 
correlation among BI victims involved in the same judicial verdict. Due to the 
unbalanced structure of the data, classical interval estimates on the correlation 
parameter are not reliable. This problem is overcome through estimation of 
the Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval. Empirical evidence has 
found that financial settlements awarded by courts present different variability 
according to the forensic participation.  
Finally, note that the suggested methodology could also have 
implications for the insurer’s reserving process since BI claims settled prior to 
a court ruling take on average less time to close. Therefore, reaching a 
negotiated agreement means reducing the time that the claim is provisioned 
within the company. 
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